4. THE IOR-AMBROSIAN SCANDAL

          A lot of books have been written about pope Luciani without any reference to the economic aspects, that, as a bishop, patriarch or pope he had to confront. The following reason is normally adduced: Luciani didn´t understand neither money nor business. Nevertheless, problems of an economic root that he confronted with rightness and firmness when  Church’s mission and credibility were at stake, are hidden. This kind of matters took place with the Antoniutti´s case (1962), with the selling of Veneto´s catholic Bank (1972) and the problem of the IOR- Ambrosian connection (1978). John Paul I has taken the important and courageous decision to put an end to the Vatican business. 

Conscience discharge

          On August 9th 1962, Albino Luciani, Vittorio Veneto´s bishop, addressed a letter to his diocesans: “Two of my priests – he said – have been mistaken; neither in the exaggerated figures that someone says or writes, nor assuming themselves responsible for the traffic of drugs or weapons or even worse things, but they have been wrong.

What had it happened? On June 17th 1962, the same day in which Calvi disappeared twenty years later, Carlo Luigi Antoniutti shot himself. During many years of doubtful activity, Antoniutti was able to rise an important financial empire, a secret bank, a lending base that collected and invested in obscure banker traffic and risked speculations. Between the many people that were attracted by a rich business perspective were two Vitorio Veneto´s priests: monsignor Stefani, parish priest and diocesan administrative service advisor, and Mr Cescon, treasurer of that service.  Finally, the terrible news: Antoniutti is in bankrupt. They try to avoid it at any cost. The treasurer does not see any other solution: the diocesan administration. But with it he will only complicate matters. Finding himself without any exit, he confesses everything to bishop Luciani, who immediately ceases him in his post, resulting the dioceses with a overdraft of more than 283 millions liras. The treasurer was condemned to one year and four months in prison. The monsignor left the dioceses. Bishop Luciani did not doubt to present to John XXIII his own dismissal, if he could not solve the matter like he thought it should be solved. The pope gave him open hand and the dioceses returned up to the last cent to all the little cheated savers: “ not because it is obliged, said Luciani, but because they are not rich people who had placed his money with the confidence in the priest” (1)

German biographer Regina Kummer put it out in her book about Albino Luciani, published on 1988, but Vitorio Veneto´s bishop was annoyed with her, because he believed that it shouldn’t be published. This author’s confidence was communicated to me by Anthony, Edward Luciani´s wife, in her home in Canale d´Agordo, where John Paul I was born.

Loris Francesco Capovilla, who was John XXIII´s secretary, and presently archbishop of Mesembria, has no inconvenience to comment Vittorio Veneto´s history. He makes it to rebate the idea that bishop Luciani were timid. He says: “He is firm, prudent. It is demonstrated in an worrying situation in which he sees two of his priests implicated in a not very clean financial operation. The bishop doesn´t doubt. He compromises his clergy in a reparation work up to sell the church’s property. Truth, justice, charity are jointly conjugated, not without mercy gestures towards the guilty persons” (2)

On 1973, Albino Luciani, Venetian patriarch, finds himself by first time with the IOR problem. Its president Marcinkus, without farther consultation, had sold Veneto Catholic Bank to Roberto Calvi, main Ambrosian Bank administrator.

The Catholic Bank, founded for the venetian dioceses, lent money at low rates and it had distinguished by its help to those sectors of the society that do not have a politic weight, like deficient and handicapped. Luciani had shown himself very interested for supporting the work special centres. At the middle of 1972, the low rates loans ended. The IOR had sold the Catholic Bank to the Ambrosian Bank. The bishops of the region urged to the Venetian patriarch to go directly to Rome. Prudently, Luciani began to investigate. What he discovered about Calvi and Sindona rendered him stunned. They, nevertheless, had Paul VI confidence.

Luciani went to visit Benelli, by that time a substitute in the State Secretary, and he told him the problem. Benelli explained himself fully. The selling of the Catholic Bank was the result of a plan started by Calvi, Sindona and Marcinkus. Marcinkus helped Calvi to disguise the true nature of this and other financial operations, keeping them out of the Italian Bank inspections, taking advantage of the ample easiness of the Vatican Bank. Bottom of the matter: “taxes evasion, bonds illegal movement”. Luciani´s reaction was quick: “What does all this have to do with the church of the poor people? In the name of God…” Benelli interrupted him: “No, Albino, in the name of the dividend” (3).

Luciani took the venetian bishops out of the Catholic Bank. After his conversation with Benelli, he commented to his secretary Mario Senigaglia: “I am liberated. I have said everything”. The same Senigaglia told me this confidence in Venice, being present Camilo Bassotto. Patriarch Luciani knew that something in the vatican finances smelled badly. When he was elected pope, he found himself in front of the problem. 

 

The IOR, the Vatican Bank 

Some history. On 1887, Lion XIII established a Commission whose function was “to keep and to administrate the capitals of the pious foundations”  On 1904 Pio X  modified this organism, and, later on, he changed its name to the Commission for the Religious Works, opening its activity to the whole Italy.

On February the 11th 1929, fifty nine years after the conquest of Rome by the Italian troops, Italy and the Vatican sign the peace in the Pacts of Letran. The Concordat with Benito Mussolini acknowledged to the pope the temporal power upon the Pontifical State or Vatican City. Besides, a financial agreement solved all pending economical matters: “Like a compensation for the losses, the Italian State donated to the Holy See one hundred millions pesetas in public treasure bonds, at five per cent rate, besides the equivalent to seventy five millions pesetas” (4).

Most of these assets were placed under a commission, the Holy See Special Administration, which invested the money in the following manner: one third in italian industries bonds, other third on real state and the last third in foreign money and gold. Other organism, the Holy See General Administration, continue administrating the assets constituted on 1876 by cardinal Antonelli.

As a consequence of the pacts of Letran it also was born the Governatorato, a Vatican State City government organism, which task was to solve the problems inherent to any State: roads, gasoline, car licensing, post, food, etc…

On 1942, Pius XII constitutes the Religious Works Institute (IOR), which task is “to undertake the capital custody and administration (in bonds and in cash) and of the real state transferred or placed under the Institute, by physical or juridical personas, assigned to the Christian religious and piety.

The IOR works under an original formula: the clients compromise themselves to hand over or to allocate, at least partially and pointing to the future, a part of their savings for religious works, which substitutes to the commissions earned by the ordinary banks: “In exchange for it, IOR´s clients earn interests free from taxes, they may convert the invested capitals into any foreign currency, with no limitations of any type and, what is even more important, they may transfer their money to any part of the world. If we take into account that there are no frontiers between Italy and the Vatican State, it can be easily understandable that the IOR had been an important platform easily used to evade capitals from Italy to foreign countries” (5).

The Pacts of Letran were the Holy See modern economy financial base. The Vatican began to intervene in the italian and international finances field in a way not thinkable years before: “In the 1950 decade, the Vatican economical organisms bought at any italian corner, contributing in this manner to the country reconstruction, destroyed by the war, but obviously looking at its own interest too… The Vatican went into the saving banks and the banks,  bonds of the British public treasure were bought;  it also went into the weapons factory Beretta or the Serono Pharmacological Institute, contraceptive pills manufacturer; bonds of a bicycle factory in Japan, of a trams industry in the United States were bought, and it went into multinational enterprises that fabricated war material, like the Lockheed”(6).

It was the years of the european big economical expansion. The benefits obtained by the Vatican “were exempt of taxes thanks to Benito Mussolini’s concession”. (7). It is affirmed that “Pius XII died with a assets of 80 millions marks in gold and bonds and his three nephews (Carlo, Marcantonio and Giulio) accumulated 120 millions in the nineteen years of pontificate of their uncle” (8). Nevertheless, John XXIII decided to interrupt the Vatican business, limiting the IOR to the ordinary administration and limiting Pope Roncalli to the catholic community donations (Saint Peter obolo) (9).

The council reform 

According to the Vatican Council II (1962-1965), the Church is mystery of communion, it lives in community. The Council sees in the community experience of the beginnings (10) the model, not only of the religious life, of the missionaries and of the priests, but of all the people of God (11). The Church is Community, not State (and less, of the worst style, dictatorial). Due to that, the State of the Vatican City is not only a historic obsolescence, but an structural contradiction, an example of what the Church shouldn’t be.

Following the Council´s indications, on August the 15th  1967, Paul VI published a document for the curia reform, Regimini Ecclesiae Universae. In relation with the economical business, the pope´s idea was to submit everything to a big ministry for the economy, called the Holy See Economical Business Prefecture.

          Cardinal Albert Di Jorio, IOR president, convinced Paul VI of the need to upkeep the bank´s independence: “You well know, Holy Father, - repeated the cardinal – that it would be impossible to keep secret the names of the clients if the IOR were inscribed among the other administrations” (12). The idea of subordinating the IOR did not like to the pope´s secretary, Mr Pasquale Macchi,  either. So, the bank was kept out of any control

Sindona and Calvi 

          Michele Sindona was born in 1920, in the Sicilian city of Patti. He licensed in fiscal right in the University of Messina. During the second world war, he was dedicated to the business of lemons. He had the Mafia’s help, which controlled the agricultural products industry. The bishop of Patti contacted him with Vito Genovese, an important member of the United States mafia who had collaborated in the invasion of Sicily by the allied forces. He, then, acknowledged that, to do something great, he should have friends in the USA (13)

In 1948 Sindona moved to Milan with his family. With a presentation letter of the bishop of Messina, he met Massimo Spada, a member of the Vatican nobility and a main layman of the IOR, and to Giovanni Battista Montini, who was a substitute to the State secretary.

The Vatican bank attractive for a financier like Sindona was obvious: “The IOR is the best foreign bank that can be imagined. In place of having the undesirable reputation of a Caribbean bank, it has Church’s moral backing. It is not responsible before any central bank governor, the secret is total… and no pope is elected by his financial perspicacity” (14)

In 1954 Montini is named archbishop of  Milan and Sindona accompanies him in his visits to factories and workshops. In 1958 the archbishop needs and important amount of money for an ancient’s home. Montini goes to Sindona, who, according to what he says, “he got the money from a CIA´s agent who was destined in Italy by that time” (15).

In 1963 Montini was elected pope with the name of Paul VI. Paul VI considered Sindona as a financial genius.

In 1968, the Italian government displaces to the left and decides to revoke the fiscal law that granted privileges to the Church in the matter of taxes. The Vatican reacts and adopts a change in its economic politics: to leave the italian opulence and to invest most of its money in several countries. In the spring of 1969 Sindona is included among the Vatican main financial advisors (16).

During the following years, Sindona associated himself intimately to the Vatican bank business in tight relationship with Marcinkus, who, since 1969 was IOR general secretary and in 1979 he was named president. Sindona´s and Vatican´s business were so much integrated that “when Sindona culminated one of his spectacular business in Italy, it wasn’t exactly known  if it was a Vatican´s or a Sindona´s or both business” (17)

But Sindona did not connected only with ecclesiastics, bankers and politicians, but also with hidden power centres. On November the 2nd 1957, in Palermo, an important Sicilian Mafioso committee elects Sindona to carry out “a mafia´s plan  to infiltrate the legitimate business all over the world”, “to reinvest the benefits obtained from the heroin” (18). Besides, on 1964, Sindona joined the loggia Propaganda Dos: “With the P2´s help,… in scarcely ten years, Sindona acquired half a dozen of banks in four countries: Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the United States” (19). Loggia P2, with Licio Gelli as great master, became “Italy’s most powerful and violent politic secret organisation” (20) 

Giuseppe Carlo Marino, a Palermo’s University Contemporary History teacher, comments on Sindona affair: “A business which heart was made of drugs and weapons traffic, couldn’t prevent, above all for the black money laundering and other similar activities, and also because of its origins and the necessarily international market to which it was directed, to have at its disposal of an organic connection with the due financial structures”. Sindona is “the personage into which shows up how the masonry – always an important part of the mafia´s middle class general history – became a mafia´s essential component”, “It is not a chance that Sindona´s activities, with those of the P2´s masonry loggia, gave the fruit of some kind of  CIA’s shadow party in Italy, a very speculative and functional organisation addressed to the interests of a very great personages net running after power in Italy”, “both for Sindona and for Gelli the best base-recourse to their disposition was the communism, since the fight against it was the alibi for their enterprises, including those of a criminal nature” (21)

Senator and mason Giussepe Corsini, who was Pistoia´s communist mayor, Gelli´s home town, reports about the fascist nature of the P2´s leader: “He was the fascist federation’s factotum  and the organiser of all the revenge actions, that, even without any motivation, were then carried out. He had a jeep to his disposal and the inseparable submachine gun with which he pointed with no doubt and he even shot, when he wanted to impose his will. Altogether with his honourable godfather Fronzaroli da Bardolino he exercised the most merciless tortures upon those who were detained under the pretext of pertaining or even of simple sympathy towards the partisan groups”(22)  

At the end of the seventies, Sindona meets Robert Calvi (Milan, 1920) and he decides to help him in his career: “When I met Calvi, says Sindona, he was a low level director in the Ambrosian Bank exterior department. But I acknowledged that Calvi was the only one, among all the bank personnel, who had an international mentality… and great brains for the international operations” (23).

Bank of business 

The Ambrosian Bank, founded by Giuseppe Tovini on 1896, offered the services typical of a credit entity and, at the same time, it was an instrument of confidence to “congregations, pious works and religious organisations of a beneficial nature” (24). The founders hoped to demonstrate how the credit activity can be carried out “with no offence to the christian teaching great ethical principles, that they could even serve like a guide to regulate economical life” (25). The specific weight of the most important bonds packages was limited to avoid the surging of powerful stockholders able to vindicate the management control. The individual stockholders never might posses packages over the five per cent (26).

On February 1971, Calvi accesses to the Ambrosian Bank general leadership. Calvi and Sindona desire to make it a modern bank of business, “a bank that not only accepted deposits and granted loans at short notice, but that it also operated aggressively in the stock market, it bought and sold companies and it undertook, in general terms, the roll of a dynamic force in the economy” (27). But an obstacle was present: the 1936 banking law in Italy prevented to the ordinary credit institutions to operate like business banks. Nevertheless, there was a way to turn around the law. It was enough to constitute a holding out of national territory and, following this, to create connections all over the world, specially in the fiscal paradises like Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Central America. And if later on this financial foreign society also wanted to get into Italy, it would be difficult to find out if the money came from the home bank or, on the contrary, from foreign clients.

Therefore, Calvi starts, one after another, all the bastions of his empire, beginning in Luxembourg with the Compendium, that later on becomes the Ambrosian Holding. The Compendium has three derivations: the Ultrafin in New York, that of Zurich, and the Cisalpine Overseas in the Bahamas, later on Ambrosian Overseas. For the less risky movements of capital, Calvi also has the Bank of Gotardo, in Lugano. Calvi is the administrator of the empire, “with full powers according to the will of the Administration Council and the stock holders”(28). The Ambrosian Bank became the first private bank in Italy. There were, besides, “the foreign holdings, those known and those ignored”, as far as in South America and in Asia (29)

The Pope´s, the P2´s and the mafia´s banker 

On 1969 spring, the government (centre-leftist) irrevocably decided that the Vatican was obliged to pay taxes on its stocks.

The Vatican addressed Sindona for help. The sicilian banker proposed a strategy to evade Vatican resources out of Italy and to invest them in the eurodollar market through a societies net that paid taxes in a duty free regime. The trick not only would give more discretion to the Vatican, but it would also demonstrate the power of the Vatican to other countries. Sindona said that, in the long term, they would see that Italy would be the one harmed.

Michele Sindona would work in an intimate relationship with bishop Marcinkus, Vatican Bank president. Nevertheless, “Sindona would have the decisive authority” (30). Therefore, Michele Sindona, mafioso and mason had become the “pope´s banker”.

Did Paul VI know the hidden side of Sindona´s personality? It’s hard to believe it. But the truth is that he placed the Vatican´s financial future in the hands of a man that was the mafia´s banker and the loggia P2´s banker.

According to Luigi Di Fonzo, Harvard university teacher and author of a book titled Michele Sindona, Saint Peter´s banker (1983), it is difficult to believe that Paul VI wouldn’t hear the rumours about Sindona´s ties with the mafia and the P2: “In the international bank real world those appearing like enemies at day light, often appear like allies under the night’s shelter”. He also says: “The right wing of the Christian Democracy… has been the protection of the Vatican interests in Italy. Nevertheless, from 1947, the demo christians have also been mafia´s partners. It doesn´t mean that the Vatican or the demo christians do nor condemn mafia´s actions”(31). It means that they have common interests.

In 1967 a report sent to the italian police from the Interpol, identifies Sindona like the leader of a mafioso and bankers group which were “involved in the stimulant, antidepressant and hallucinogenic drugs unlawful traffic between Italy, United States and, possibly, another european countries”. The name of Michele Sindona appears in the first position in the report’s list (32). But nobody can beat him.

In a final report the italian Parliamentarian  Commission for the bankruptcy of the sicilian banker, says: “The sale of the Società Generale Inmobiliare (SGI, society of Vatican real state sing) points out the start of the vatican financial demobilisation and of the relationship, more and more tight, between the IOR and the Sindona´s system”. It is not a simple economic transaction, but the establishment of a co-operation: “The effect of the alliance, becoming perhaps a symbiosis, between the Vatican and Sindona is double: by one side, it legitimates Sindona in the internal and in the international fields, which allows him to advance toward his objective to create a financial empire; on the other side, there is the power acquired by Sindona in front of the italian authorities, who do not consider him like a private banker, but like Saint Peter’s shadow. This background is, without any doubt, one of the keys to understand Sindona´s power system” (33)

An action and protection pact

During those years Sindona centres the economical activity: “His banks, id est,  the Banca Unione and the Banca Privata Finanziaria, whose merging gives birth to the Banca Privata Italiana, are dedicated to capitals exportation on behalf of the large, median and small businessmen and of liberal professionals, terrified by the lira progressive depreciation” (34). Years later, in an italian TV programme, Sindona would say: “As IOR president, Marcinkus was a partner in two of my banks”.

The socialist magazine Critica sociale in an informative service published on 1980, reports that in the 1969 Christmas Night, a historic supper took place in attorney Umberto Ortolani´s roman office, Licio Gelli´s right hand arm in the P2: “The fellow dinners were Calvi, Sindona and Gelli; the host, Ortolani. Meeting purpose: to establish an action pact between the two bankers, by which Calvi would be helped, thanks to the Vatican support that Ortolani had, to progress in the bank, while Sindona backed from the outside becoming his partner in any of the operations jointly started in the future. On his part, Gelli, would guarantee the political support at every level and in the most diverse checkerboards.” (35). It was an action and protection pact.

In Sindona´s arms, Calvi contacts the Vatican financial leader, Paul Marcinkus. Clara, Mrs Calvi, declared from Nassau (Bahamas): “It was Sindona the one who made the acquaintance of Marcinkus to my husband. It was the end of the year 1970, which we spent here altogether” (36).

To the common creed (Church-money-anticommunism) that united the three bankers, added the international masonry shadow, that of the secret services and the one of the italo-american mafia. The British mason John McCaffrey (former British counterespionage leader in Italy, member of the administration council of the Private Bank, affiliated to Edinburg´s masonry who disposes of the loggia of the Hermanos Negros) acknowledges it. The question was “to place in common to those who shared the western sane ideas in order to oppose communism diffusion in Europe. Due to this I joined the business world” (37).

Calvi substitutes Sindona

On March the 14th 1974 the italian newspapers of leftist trend, report the losses of the Franklin National Bank, the bank controlled by Sindona beyond the ocean. The rumour gives way to a massive deposit withdrawal. On October the 8th the  Franklin National Bank was declared insolvent. Sindona´s empire is in bankrupt. That same month the italian government publishes two imprisonment orders against Sindona. Carlo Bordoni, Sindona´s group key operations director, flees to Venezuela.

Gelli phoned Sindona, who was hidden in Switzerland: “Flee from Switzerland before the Interpol is notified. Go away from here so that they can’t ask for your extradition. If you don’t do it, our enemies will torture you. They even can kill you… Things have changed. Perhaps, if you are able to escape, I will in due time be able to help you. If not, if they capture you, you already know what you must do” (38).

Sindona put into his baggage four bottles of digital. One toxic dose produce arrhythmia in the heart muscles and, at the end, muscular fibrillation. The muscles vibrate, but they do not move the blood through the body. The result is the death.

The world falls down over Sindona: “The strong ties he has established with the United States republican party start to decay: just on 1976, democrat Jimmy Carter wins the presidential elections and, after the Watergate scandal, the new power occupants tolerate badly any kind of ambiguous activities. Meanwhile, in Italy, judges Ovilio Urbisci and Guido Viola, in charge to investigate the bankruptcy, are bringing to light, with Ambrosoli´s help, the secrets of his castles of cards” (39)

At the time to find a substitute to the system created by Sindona, Calvi has no rivals. Both systems are the same, “to pillage the societies they lead, following the principle that the losses will be socialised in one side of the frontier, the italian, and the benefits privatised in the other, the foreign” (40).

The relationship between Sindona and Calvi breaks in 1977. It is necessary the participation of somebody , that somebody pays out the 250.000 millions liras to put an end to the bankruptcy procedure. Calvi promises to help him, but he doesn´t.

On November the 3rd 1977 Milan’s centre walls appear with white, blue and yellow manifestos. The papers are signed: Public institutions vigilance committee. The manifest explains the way in which the Calvi-Sindona association worked: “The sicilian in bankruptcy attracted in the Stock Exchange large number of bonds that later on he sent abroad, to the customary Liechtenstein or Panama “magic boxes”, from where they were sold to foreign societies or to its filials, with bulky benefits that were deposited into the Cimafin banking accounts. Calvi made these operations under the counter, since they did not appear at all in the official accountability. Therefore, either one thing or the other: either Calvi used the bank secret funds, or he illicitly used his clients´ deposits” (41). It is Sindona´s revenge.  

Calvi boasts a supreme calm. Gelli has already made his election and he is inclined for him. He is now the secret loggia’s banker, as much for the clean business, as for the dirty ones. The P2 is in a large expansion and the Ambrosian Bank is one of its main operational arms. 

Expansion in South America 

Sindona had the P2´s bankers preference for the Latin-Americans dictators: “I prefer to meet with men like Somoza. To deal with a dictator is much easier than to deal with democratically elected governments: these have many commissions, many controls.” (42).

Besides, the common view of the masonry and the politics tied the P2´s men with the Latin-American dictators. Sindona will say it too: “Ortolani and Gelli had a good relationship with the governments (Latin-American) because a large percentage of them was composed by masons. A great part of the South America military governments belong to the masons. In Argentine, Peron was one of the masonry leaders; Massera, who was the Argentine’s  strong man and Gelli´s personal friend, was one of South America’s best known masons” (43).

At the beginning of the seventies, Calvi installed the Overseas Ambrosian Bank in the Bahamas. After founding the ghost societies in Panama he also made brief incursions to Central America. On 1977, following an interview with the dictator Anastasio Somoza, Calvi opened the Ambrosian Group’s Commercial Bank in Nicaragua. In 1978, the Nicaraguan civil war obliged Calvi to look for a new Latin American base and so is how the Andino Ambrosian Bank was born in Peru. Calvi transferred then to Lima, from Managua and another locations, most of the ghost societies´ loans. All decisions were taken in Milan. On 1980 the South America Ambrosian Bank was founded in Argentina, with headquarters in Buenos Aires. Lucio Gelli´s hand was behind it.

With Calvi´s expansion in Latin America, two grave menaces hang over him: the italian justice investigates the exportation of his capitals and, besides, his plan to control the Ambrosian through ghost societies begins to cause financial tensions. Legal and financial problems feed reciprocally in a vicious circle: “Gelli offered Calve protection against the judicial investigations, but it looks like the price of such protection was for Calvi to take out money from the Ambrosian chests to bribe and to grant questionable loans to the P2´s brothers. Of course, this action aggravated the financial tension. If they were uncover, these questionable loans could start new judicial investigations against Calvi, what obliged to pay and additional protection” (44)

Outside Italy most of Gelli´s friends were in Latin America. Nevertheless, his most powerful contacts lied in Argentina. Gelli´s penetration in the argentine power structure came from his friendship with Juan Domingo Peron. In his P2´s list, Gelli included personages like Jose Lopez Rega, Social Welfare minister and Triple A organiser (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), a death squadron to which hundreds of people disappeared are attributed. He also added Admiral Emilio Massera, Navy head, considered “excessively cruel, in disposition to use the most repulsive tortures against his adversaries”.

Peron adjudicated Gelli an argentine diplomatic post, and named him Argentine’s embassy in Rome  special economic advisor. Peron died on 1974 and on July the 1st his vice-president, Isabelita, (and widow) succeeded him. On March 1976, a military junta overthrow her. Gelli get out unharmed from the coup, because one of the three junta members was his former friend Admiral Massera, Navy Head. The P2´s leader not only survived the coup d´état, but he even prospered with it: the new country’s government very soon decided to invest thousands millions dollars in weapons import, and Italy was one of the large suppliers. Gelli, altogether with Admiral Massera, dedicated to weapons traffic.” (45).

Gelli´s power in Italy and Latin America reaches its peak on 1978, precisely when Calve begins to feel the menace of the investigation that the Bank of Italy carries out on the Ambrosian.

Bank of Italy investigation 

On April 17th 1978, one team of the Bank of Italy inspectors, led by Giulio Padalino, initiates an investigation in the Ambrosian Bank, that ends on November the 17th of the same year. According to the investigators, large bonds packages had been acquired by subsidiaries of the Ambrosian group, “by foreign corporations sited in Panama and Liechtenstein”.

The report mentions evident signs that such societies could be a shield to hide the fact that the control was practised by Calvi or the IOR, the Vatican bank. More than 25 pages of the report are dedicated to the relationship between the Ambrosian and the IOR: “Independently of its position as stockholder, the IOR is tied by strong interest connections to the `Ambrosian Group´, as it is demonstrated by its constant presence in some of the most meaningful and delicate operations… about which nature the highest reserve is promoted” (46)

On December the 14th 1978, Padalino delivered the investigation results to his superiors in the Bank of Italy and, also, to the italian magistracy. The matter was charged to one of the Milan most respected instruction judges, Emilio Alessandrini.

“We are carrying our inquiries”, answers Alessandrini to one of L´Espresso newspaperman who asks him for information. It was January the 10th 1979. On the 26th the same newspaperman asks by phone: “Are there any news?”. “We are moving”. “Do you foresee to retire the passport to Calvi?”. “That could happen; and perhaps some additional things”. “His arrest?” “I save the answer”. Three days later, Alessandrini was assassinated by a terrorist squad called First Line (47), “officially for being subversive” (48).

Lucca Mucci substitutes Alessandrini. Through his contacts with the Finances Guard, Gelli was systematically obstructing and delaying the investigation. Nevertheless, on June the 12th 1980 Mucci received a report from the Finances Guard: “it contained proof that Calvi and some of his collaborators had committed several grave crimes: illegal capital exportation, bank documents forging and fraud” (49).

Two weeks later, Mucci ordered Calvi to deliver his passport. Calvi and Gelli did everything possible to recover it, even at least temporally, and they didn´t get it.

          On March 1979, Mucci managed to know who were the twenty main Ambrosian Bank stockholders. The main stockholder is the bank itself, with the 7,39 % of the total. The Vatican possesses, through the IOR, the 1,82 % (50), but the financial plots wrapped by Calvi and Marcinkus were multiple and, many times, shameful: “In the course of five years (1972-1977) the Vatican has been rewarded with almost 70 millions lira because of having agreed to several operations with titles carried out by the Ambrosian group societies. The function of the IOR, that under the italian legislation is a non-resident bank and due to this it is not submitted to the limitations applied to the italian banks, consisted of acting like a shadow in the transfer of titles carried out by the Ambrosian team” (51).

          On October the 2nd 1980, Massimo Spada was arrested under the accusation of having collaborated, in IOR´s representation, in the Banca Privata Finanziaria crack. Due to health and age reasons, he was set free provisionally a little later. For the same reasons, on February the 7th 1981, Spada´s successor in the IOR, Luigi Mennini,  was arrested. Marcinkus explained that the arrest was due to Mennini´s membership, some years before, of Sindona´s Banca Unione executive committee, and that the IOR had nothing to do in this matter. The clamour was amazing, because Mennini´s only function there was to represent the IOR´s interests.

          Five days later, during the annual reception that takes place in Rome to commemorate the Letran pacts signature, Agostino Casaroli, State secretary commented:  “Those who criticise are right. We can’t continue like this. We must change” (52).

Sindona´s kidnapping

At the end of January 1979, doctor Joseph Miceli Crimi, north american physician of sicilian origin and a P2´s member, appears in Sindona´s office, in New York. He tells him: “We are a group of sicilian patriots, most of us masons, and we need your help to overthrow the italian government in Sicily. We know that you hate the communists and we are aware of the persecution that you confront here as well as in Italy. We need you. Your financial experience, your personality, your charisma would contribute to the success of the coup. Sicily’s people does not believe that you are a criminal, don Michele” (53).

As soon as doctor Crimi leaves his office, Sindona phones Gelli. This tells him that Crimi is an honest man and deserves confidence, although he is not very brilliant. Two days later, they meet in New York. Gelli says that Crimi´s plan is an insanity: “It only could succeed if the P2´s military and political members approve it (54).

On March the 9th, north american justice processes Sindona, accusing him of 99 fraud, perjury and misappropriation of funds charges. He is set free on bail of 3 millions dollars and the condition of reporting every day in the justice officer office.

On June, doctor Crimi again calls on Sindona. The masons and a small partisans group are willing to get into action. But they need more men and they need mafia´s support. Sindona meets with John Gambino and Rosario Spatola in a Motel Conca d´Oro room, in Staten Island. He tells them: “We can do it. But we need two hundred additional men. More weapons. If you help me, I would guarantee to all mafia people an amnesty of all the crimes committed before the coup. But we ought to leave drug traffic. It is necessary to end with all the mafia´s crimes” (55). Rosario Spatola said that he would have to speak to the family’s leader Gambino in New York and with his people in Sicily.

          On July the 20th, John Gambino and Rosario Spatola answer to Sindona. They support Sicilian Action. If Sindona agrees, they can provide him passport and disguise, but the trip was already prepared for Joseph Macaluso and doctor Crimi

On August the 2nd, Sindona (that now answers to the name of Joseph Bonamico) gets into a TWA plane to Vienna. He changes the anticipated plan to arrive to Florence and he ends in Salzburg. From here he phones doctor Crimi. The doctor tells him to go back to Vienna to wait for instructions. Sindona begins to suspect: Crimi looked rare.

In the United States, Sindona´s secretary receives an anonymous phone call: “We have kidnapped Michele Sindona. He must respond before the proletarian justice”. The message was written in italian and signed by the “Proletarian Committee for the Implantation of a Better Justice”.

Doctor Crimi communicates to Sindona a plan change: to reach Palermo through Greece. Therefore, they would meet in Athens. On August 12th, Crimi arrives to Athens with three men to whom he presents as masons. Really, only one of them. Ignacio Puccio, a Palermo butcher, was a mason. The other two belong to Rosario Spatola´s crime syndicate: Giacomo Vitale and Francesco Foderà.

On August the 16th,  they arrive to Brindisi on a ship. Due to security reasons they form two groups: Crimi and Puccio get on the train, Vitale and Fodera take Sindona by car

“There is something rare in all this process, says Sindona to his fellows. In all this matter there is something that stinks. I am returning to Greece. From there I will come back to the United States and I will defend myself.”

One of the men take a revolver out of his pocket. The other tells him: “You must come with us. The leader wants you to go to Palermo. If you flee, we will kill you and your family” (56)

They arrive to Palermo. His kidnappers take him to Francesca Paola Longo´s home, a teacher friend of Crimi and Rosario Spatola. Crimi and Francesca dictate him extortion letters. The letters demand money in compensation for not revealing certain documents, also demand documents and they are signed by the Proletarian Committee for a Better Justice. About the fourth day Sindona has grown beard, he has lost weight and he has bags around his eyes. It is the moment to make him a photograph to send it to his family and his attorneys. They tie him to a chair and they hang around his collar a notice  saying: “We will make him the trial he deserves”.

On August the 23rd, Rosario and Vincenzo Spatola take him to another home. With his eyes blindfold, he is taken to a room before a man identified as “il padrone”.

“Mr Sindona, tells him the man, you have become a bother for us… Because of your legal problems, the police is investigating heroin traffic between Sicily, France , the United States and other countries. When such a fact happens, our men are arrested, because the judges are afraid to protect us. This produces deaths. Assassinations enhance our power, but, Mr Sindona, assassination does not produce money”.

“I am Licio Gelli´s friend, says Sindona. He promised help to me. He has power, you surely know it. Talk to him. He can tell you that this is true”.

“Gelli is nobody, Michele. He is a labourer. Gelli only exists if he does not become a problem for us, as you have become. Look the things that Bordoni has told about you. He calls you the mafia´s banker. Some friends told you to get rid of him, but you insisted. You rebelled. Look what has happened now, Michele. You must confront the facts. We want you to transfer your money to different banking accounts. We want to know the names of the politicians who have helped you. If you give us this information, we can negotiate. Nothing will happen to those who pay for being protected. The rest will be sacrificed” (58).

During the following weeks, Sindona is constantly interrogated by different men, most of them hooded. On September the 21st, Crimi goes to Arezzo to meet Gelli. Crimi delivers him a letter in which Sindona requests his help. Gelli convinces Roberto Calvi to withdraw thirty thousand millions lira (50 millions dollars) out of Sindona´s Bank of Gotardo account. The money is delivered to a messenger that represents the mafia.

On September the 23rd, Spatola and John Gambino tell Sindona that they will not set him free: “Don’t try any trick. You have seen our organisation. You know we can found you or your family at any time. Accomplish your word, get the documents and your family will be safe”.

Sindona assents. But Crimi intervenes: “He can’t come back as easy as that. We must be sure about what he will say and we must do something to make believe that he has been kidnapped by terrorists. We must shoot him”. Crimi shot him in a leg, he cleaned the wound and he bandaged it

On October the 7th, John Gambino, Crimi and the two bodyguards (Vitale and Foderà) accompany Sindona, who is with wig and sun spectacles on, in the flight from Palermo to Milan. John Gambino tells him: “You are going to Frankfort with doctor Crimi and the rest. My brother has connections with the TWA. He will take you to the United States” (60). On October the 16th, 72 days later, Rosario Gambino frees Sindona in New York beside a telephone box, in the corner of the 42nd street with the 10th Ave in Manhattan.

The P2´s lists 

At the beginning of 1981 two Milanese magistrates, who are investigating Sindona´s ties with the mafia, travel to Palermo to interrogate doctor Joseph Miceli Crimi. The judges ask him why during the period in which Sindona had been kidnapped in Palermo, he had all of a sudden travelled to Arezzo: “I travelled to Arezzo, answers Crimi, because my dentist lives there and this summer I suffered a toothache”. The magistrates do not agree with that answer and, finally, Crimi confess: “The truth is that I travelled to Arezzo because Licio Gelli was there; Gelli is my mason brother and a Michele Sindona´s close friend”. The magistrates immediately order a Gelli´s house search, in Arezzo, and into his office in the near city of Castiglion Fibocchi. It was on March the 17th.

This is how the P2´s lists appear. Gelli had recruited 962 powerful personages for his loggia, pertaining to most of the sectors of the system: politicians, militaries, intelligence services, businesses and finances, mass media. It is also discovered that “Gelli had been involved in a long series of scandals that go back to the previous decade, including the Sindona´s case, the scandal ENI/Petromin and the recent Calvi´s case. Besides, among Gelli´s friends there were several persons tied to rightist terrorism actions and to conspiracies to overthrow the italian government” (61)

In Gelli´s archives also appear two folders about Calvi, what puts out that Gelli followed step by step Calvi´s affair (62).

Calvi will confirm his adhesion to P2: “As a matter of fact, I adhered to Lucio Gelli´s P2… who presented himself like a man with important initiatives as leader of the Institution P2, and used to put out his diverse initiatives in the business field as taken under the guidance of the Great London Mother Loggia.

According to Anna, Calvi´s daughter, his father attempted to grow apart from the P2´s leaders some months before the explosion of the loggia history: “My father had already began to say no to answer to Gelli´s or Ortolani´s phone calls. He asked me to say that he was not at home, or that he was ill or sleeping” (64).

Clara, Calvi´s widow, and his daughter Anna have revealed that Gelli never said his true name when somebody from the family asked him who was he: “He answered them with his coded name: Luciani” (65). Same affirms Bettino Craxi, Italian Socialist Party general secretary by that time. At the beginning of 1980. in the Hotel Rafael where he had his roman residence, he receives a “courtesy visit”, a man who presents himself “like an exponent of P2´s loggia”, with the name of “Luciani, engineer Luciani”: “When he comes and talks to me, says Craxi, I understand about what and with whom I am talking”. It was not only a courtesy visit and the man was Gelli himself (66).

P2´s scandal didn´t explode until some weeks later. The copies of the lists were delivered to first minister Arnaldo Forlani, who decided not to divulge them. Gelli fled from Italy, but he continued to communicate with Calvi. Besides, he had the time to try to limit the scandal magnitude.

On April the 3rd 1981, Calvi´s case was entrusted to a new examining magistrate, Gerardo D´Ambrosio, who adopted a much more sever attitude.

Italian Economy Minister Beniamino Andreatta was expecting it. In the first months of the year 81, he manifested his worry to cardinal Casaroli, State Secretary: “In the occasion of a meeting requested by cardinal Casaroli to talk about other matters, I could express to him my concern about the IOR-Ambrosian connection.  I remember telling to the cardinal that I was afraid of the possibility to reach situations similar to those that took place in the past between Sindona and the IOR”. He also told him: “get free of Calvi as soon as possible” (67).

In an interview, on February the 13th 1990, Licio Gelli comments:

- -      I had sometimes lunch with Roberto Calvi. I often saw him choleric, especially when he returned from the meetings he has in the IOR. In fact, I said: In things go wrong, the Almighty would have to leave Italy.

- -      The Almighty?

- -      Of course, the pope!, explained Gelli in a malicious tone (68)

Calvi in prison 

That month of May 1981 was terrible. On the 13th, in Saint Peter´s square, John Paul II suffered a brutal attempt. On the 20th, Calvi was arrested: “An unprecedented earthquake shook the financial world” (69). Confusion and panic dominated the Ambrosian. That same day, another fact joined to increase the commotion caused by Calvi´s arrest: the P2´s lists were made public. Calvi was the most outstanding banker in the Gelli´s lists. The publication of these lists brought down Arnaldo Forlani´s government, and for first time in forty years the government head did not belong to the Christian Democracy Party. The Christian Democrats left the office to a member of other party: Giovanni Spadolini, of the Republican Party. 

In the prison of Lodi, Calvi explained to his wife Clara and his daughter Anna what they can do to help him: “He told them that it was necessary to mobilise the politicians whose parties had benefited from the Ambrosian generosity, so that they would use their influence in his favour. He added that it was essential to put pressure on the IOR, the Vatican Bank. Calvi revealed to his family that he had not made on his own behalf the two operations with bonds for which he has been arrested, but that they were carried out in representation of the IOR. The Bank of Gotardo, the Ambrosian Swiss bank, possesses documents proving the IOR´s intervention. But Swiss laws about the banking secret did not allow to the Gotardo to deliver the papers without the IOR´s authorisation. The banker indicated to his family that the pressure should be put on the two main IOR directors: Archbishop Marcinkus and Luigi Mennini. During a visit to the prison of his wife and his daughter, he even delivered them some papers in which it was written down: This trial is called IOR”.

When Clara and Anna went out of the prison they met with Luigi Mennini´s son, Alessandro, an Ambrosian executive. “On seeing the papers that my daughter had in her hand, he tried to snatch them away – told Clara Calvi later on -. But I sat down on them and did not let them to go off”. Clara Calvi affirms that Mennini told them then”. You should not mention this name (the IOR) not even in the confessional box”

On May the 22nd, magistrate Gerardo D´Ambrosio interrogated Calvi in a four and a half hours session: he requested him explanations about one of the anomalous operations with bonds and about his relationship with Gelli. At last, Calvi understood that he had lost the game and he clumsily said: “I am unable to give any explanation”. The magistrate came back the following day, taking with him some documents about Calvi´s judicial affair found in Gelli´s archives.

The trial began on May the 29th. The court president is Guido Roda Bogetti and the prosecutor, Corrado Carnavalli, a magistrate competent in foreign currency export. During the night from the 2nd to the 3rd of July, Calvi calls for some Milanese magistrates. He is discouraged, he is conscious that everybody has turned away from him, that he has lost the judicial battle and that  he must confront a severe sentence. Pestered with questions, Calvi breaks to weep and, alternating long pauses with deep sighs, he delivers an important confession: “I am the lowest of the low, try to understand… The Ambrosian Bank is not mine. I am a just a dogsbody of others”. The magistrates insist: “But, who commands you? Who is the proprietary of the bank?”. “I can’t tell you anymore”, answers Calvi (71).

Nevertheless, that same night, the Milanese banker comments to the magistrates his relationship with Gelli and, above all, with Umberto Ortolani: “Ortolani had friends in all the environments, even at international level, particularly among the London masonry. I repeatedly could check that Ortolani had high level friends also in the ecclesiastic environment, under his position like Malta Knights Order ambassador. Precisely Ortolani was the one who, slowly, made me understand that in my position I had a particular need of protection and support at the political, financial, administrative, etc… level, that he said he, with Gelli, could guarantee to me. Eventually Ortollani introduced himself more and more in my banking activity, proposing me interventions, agreements with other financial groups, convincing me that I could also be the one to finance the Rizzoli editorial group. Under such context he made me understand that it could be useful to finance political parties”. (71)

On July the 9th the news spread that Calvi tried to commit suicide during the night: he ingested a number of pills and he wounded himself in his right wrist. The opinions are diverse: “he made it in a moment of depression, seeing that the trial was marching against him”, “he wishes to raise court’s compassion”, “he wishes to provoke friend political forces intervention”.

Finally, on June the 20th the court pronounces the sentence: Calvi and other three Ambrosian group leaders are declared guilty. Calvi receives the most severe sentence: four years in prison and a sixteen millions lira fine (more than ten millions dollars). The  prisoners obtain the provisional freedom. The Vatican, the Christian Democracy and the socialists defend Calvi (73).

Vatican´s Bank guarantee

          Alarm spread in the Ambrosian Bank. On August, the Bank Andino of Peru manager flew to Milan and held a tempestuous meeting with Calvi. Giorgio Nassano, Andino´s president, reported later on to the Financial Times that “he and his colleagues directors menaced to resign immediately if Calvi did not offer them guarantees that the loans to the Panama societies would be reimbursed”. (74).

Calvi resorted to Marcinkus. He requested him some kind of guarantee that could help him to gain time while he cleared the Ambrosian financial problems. Marcinkus rejected to extend an explicit guarantee, but he accepted to write some sponsorship letters. Wrote on September the 1st and on October the 26th 1981 in the IOR and addressed to the Lima Andino Ambrosian and the Managua Commercial Ambrosian, the letters said that the IOR controlled “directly or indirectly” eight societies (six in Panama) and that “it knew its debt”, which at that moment had raised to some 1.000 millions dollars. The letters were signed by: Mennini, Marcinkus executive, and Pellegrino de Stroebel, IOR accountability director. (75)

The creditors could breathe calm. What they did not know was that Marcinkus had no intention to pay off the debts. There was another letter, secret, from Calvi to the IOR, written on August the 27th, in which it was ensured that the IOR would not suffer “additional harm nor loses” (76). It was the defence letter

Marcinkus explain it as follows: “Calvi gets out of prison in 1981 and he comes and tells me: `I have problems and I don’t know how to solve them. Since I can’t take care of everything, please help me and look after these matters. He didn´t say that they were our own matters. I requested him to write a letter, an explanatory letter, in which it would be said that those business neither were ours nor had ever been. I insisted that any measures should be taken to decrease the debt, and that in one year and a half everything must be solved and we completely disengaged from the business. It is like a trustee compromise. I didn´t give him a guarantee or any thing similar to that. The only thing we knew was the existing debt, that is all”. (77)

After taking over the Ambrosian vice-presidency, on Autumn 81,  Roberto Rosone began interrogating Calvi about the loans to the Panama societies. Calvi vehemently said: “The Vatican, the pope, is behind these debts”. At the beginning of 82, Rosone insisted in the same point and Calvi silenced him with this phrase: “Does that mean that you keep any doubt about the Vatican central bank?” (78).

On December, the financier Carlo De Benedetti, as Ambrosian vice-president and stockholder, tried to know with precision the relationship existing between the bank of Calvi  (and of the P2) and the bank of the pope. Since Calvi eluded the answer saying that those were “particularly reserved matters”, De Benedetti looked for another way and he got a private meeting with monsignor Achille Silvestrini,  in the State Secretary:

“The meeting took place in Rome, in my office, being present – as friend and as a courtesy – the honourable Virginio Rognoni (Minister of the Interior and demo Christian member of the Parliament). In that occasion, starting with the explicit affirmation that Marcinkus, IOR president, was a thief and that it seemed inconceivable that a State such as the Vatican could have confided its own finances to a guy like that, I talked about the need, in the Vatican interest,  to analyse in depth the IOR activity and the IOR-Ambrosian relationship. Monsignor Silvestrini, with a hurt air, took note of my firm and explicit talk, and told me that not even them – referring to Cardinal Casaroli  -  had a great knowledge about the IOR activity” (79).

New protectors  

On March 81, Calvi hires Francesco Pazienza as an Ambrosian consultant. Pazienza acknowledges himself as a mason in his book The disobedient. He belongs to the Italian Great Orient from May 1980, legitimated by the British Great Loggia.

Some months before, on November 25th 1980, Pazienza had gone to the Vatican, sent by general Santovito, SISMI by then, the Italian Information and Military Security Service. Monsignor Celata, Cardinal Casaroli´s right arm, was waiting him there. The reason for this meeting: he wanted to acquire a documentation compromising Marcinkus. Pazienza began to investigate:

“In Switzerland, in Peter Duft´s home, a Zurich attorney – who had been Cardinal Vagnozzi´s advisor and depository of many of his documents – I luckily found some letters dangerously compromising for Monsignor Marcinkus, probably the same that, through monsignor Celata, was Cardinal Casaroli seeking. In effect, they were documents deposited by Cardinal Vagnizzi, already dead, in Switzerland. The purple had been a Cardinal Marcinkus´ bitter enemy from the moment in which he ousted him from the management of the vatican finances”

“The most surprising matter, deduced from those documents, says Pazienza, was that the pope was badly thought of in the circle of those who should have been his most close and faithful collaborators. His `fault´ was to be a sort of `marcian´, a true and own `strange´, arrived from Poland and fully outside and rejected by the hard nucleus of italian prelates constituting the historic core of the Curia, used to handle in their own way and in an absolute manner, the complicated but almost perfect vatican machine. Therefore, one couldn’t `trust´ him, since the consolidated and built during so many years power, inside and outside the Holy See walls, could be in danger,. The danger of breaking the incrustations that, like a strange, he would at the end discover, existed, and he would have tried to diminish and destroy them, since very little or even nothing had to do with the Holy Mother Church, but only with criteria, perhaps cynical and heartless, of management and  maintenance of the temporary power. Therefore, to  `neutralise´ the new pope, above all, isolating him and preventing him to create a staff of persons of his absolute confidence, was completely necessary. The fact that a privileged axis between John Paul II and Paul Marcinkus were established, taking into account that the cardinal had the strings of the money bag and, therefore, a very great power,  annoyed a lot to those conspiring and have induced them to take action in a so sudden and unusual way” (81)

There was, besides, the support of John Paul II to the polish trade union Solidarity: “The flow of money reaching Varsovia through the IOR and, more correctly, through the financial institute which was the vatican bank secular allied by excellence and through Marcinkus: it is to say, the Ambrosian Bank, whose president was Roberto Calvi. On January 1981, such information were properly confirmed to me by the French, whose intelligence services were very different to the Italian ones” (82).

Another new Calvi´s protector is Flavio Carboni, a Sardinian business man, who seemed to have a surprising amount of friends in high positions: in the political, editorial, Vatican, intelligence services and criminal world. “Once disappeared Licio Gelli, refugee in a foreign country, the Milanese banker was almost orphan and isolated… Through the time I had the opportunity to repent to have been in contact with Carboni and, above all, of having made his acquaintance with Calvi” (83), says Pazienza.

On December 81, Carboni assumed the roll of main Calvi´s public relations manager.

Roberto Rosone, Ambrosian vice-president, defined Pazienza and Carboni as “individuals who scare you only by seeing them” (84)

On September the 2nd of 1981 the ordinary section of the Cassation Court issues an order according to which all the investigations directly or indirectly related with the P2 are under the jurisdiction of the roman seat of the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic. Therefore, the Milan and Brescia magistrates must leave the summaries and send them to Rome: “The political power can’t tolerate that some politically independent magistrates handle delicate investigations that in some aspects involve the secretaries of the two most important parties of the Government” (85).

The roman prosecution office move is directly managed by Achille Gallucci, first Roman Republic prosecutor, and the delegate prosecutor Domenico Sica: “Sica carries out a great activity in Rome: the most delicate and hot activities of the close times are assigned to him at these moments, from Aldo Moro´s assassination to that of the newspaper Mino Pecorelli, going through the Pope Wojtyla´s attempt” (86).

Another matter. The story known like Protection account is discovered when in Gelli´s archives appear an envelope titled Deputy Claudio Martelli, with three writings of an explosive contain. The first says: “Three millions and a half dollars in the Protection account number 633369, of the UBS: Fiorini, DDL and Martelli on account of Bettino Craxi, 28 – 10 – 1980”; the second paper: “They will be followed by another three millions and a half at the contract’s signature”. The third is a note in the back of an envelope titled Chamber of Deputies: Pay in the account number 633369” (87).

On May the 10th 1981, the weekly L´Expresso publishes the news of these compromising documents, at the sight of which the Milanese magistrates Viola and Fenizia open a criminal lawsuit, dictating diligence against Martelli, the  Ente Nazionalle Idrocarburi (ENI) vice-president, Leonardo Di Donna (DDL), the financial director of the mentioned organisation, Florio Fiorini and Roberto Calvi. It is suspected that Calvi has paid a seven millions dollars commission upon a monetary operation between the ENI and the Ambrosian. The Milanese instructors, besides, are convinced that the account Protection does not hide a physical person, but a fiduciary society with seat in Hong-Kong.

In effect, in 1980, Roberto Calvi obtained an important credit from the ENI – controlled by the socialists – for his bank. The Ambrosian was already running into problems, and Calvi was ready to do anything to get fresh money. In exchange he paid to the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) seven millions dollars in two instalments, that passed through the Protection account. The account was opened in a Swiss bank “to the name of a Craxi´s friend architect, Silvano Larini, but the money really went into PSI´s hands”. (88)

Ambrosian´s Bank crack. 

          In 1981 Calvi tries several plans to save the Ambrosian Bank crack. In order to this, he appealed to the Opus Dei: “The organisation would buy the Ambrosian shares that were under the ghost societies, avoiding the financial losses (and also the damage to its public image), that the Holy See would suffer if the Bank crack happened. In exchange for this the Opus Dei would obtain several privileges in the Church”. (89).

On his part, Pazienza wishes to introduce general Pietro Musumeci, former SISMI director and a P2 member,  into the Ambrosian. At the end of 1981, Musumeci appears in the bank offices to organize the vigilance services control. But the project is too expensive: “Not even the Sha of Persia could allow himself a so costly security service”, tells Rosoni to Calvi, implying that he opposes to the service.

On April the 27th 1982 Rosone suferred an attempt, and he is wounded. The assassin hired for the action is killed by a security guard: “The name of the hired killer, Danilo Abbruciati, puts out some upsetting data: he is a roman crook, with a record of common crimes, but, curiously enough, with an enormous fortune, so that he did not need at all the 15 or 20 millions of a contract to kill. In effect, Abbruciati was the owner, through several front men, of five cars shops, he travelled with bags full with money, he had intervened in persons kidnapping and he had also tried weapons traffic” (90).

The investigators indicated that the aggressor, who was accompanied by an accomplice called Bruno Nieddu, belonged to the roman mob known as the Magliana Band. He had in his pocket a driver’s licence and a carefully folded paper in which appeared several phone numbers. One was Ernesto Diotallevi´s, close to the Magliana Band. It was checked that, the day after the attempt against Rossone, Carboni had laid down a payment of 530.000 dollars in Diotallevi´s favour. On January the 28th 1983, the judge Fernando Imposimato, ordered Carboni and Diotallevi´s immediate capture. The second phone number, as it was known only ten years later, corresponded to Enrico Nicoletti, regarded as the Band´s cashier. (91)

Additional problems. At the end of May 82 the Bank of Gotardo claims to the IOR the amount of 300 million dollars for an operation made by Calvi. According to Flavio Carboni, “Mennini convened Calvi and required him to immediately respond to the compromise. Due to this, the banker decided to go abroad, in the certainty that the Vatican would not tighten more the string; he wished to seek money to please Mennini and company” (92).

Anna Calvi tells that she silently listened a conversation between his father and Carboni, during a weekend in May: “ My father was saying (rising his voice) to Carboni that he should make understand to the Vatican that the priests ought to honour their compromises, since, in other case, he would reveal all he knew” (93).

On May the 30th, Calvi and his daughter are alone in a property in Drezzo (Como): “My father told me that, in order to solve the problems with the IOR, he has studied and initiated a project foreseeing the direct Opus Dei intervention, organisation that should contribute an enormous figure, in an amount of more than a billion lira, to cover the IOR´s debt with the Ambrosian Bank”. Calvi tells his daughter that Casaroli is against his project, but the IOR runs the risk of bankrupt: “The priests will be obliged to sell Saint Peter´s square” . The numbers are enormous: “Because of this range of numbers, people can assassinate”. Calvi approaches his wardrobe and takes out a revolver and says: “If they come, I shall shoot them”. (94).

The Vatican Bank president, Archbishop Marcinkus, rejects for months to receive Calvi, “although he had been his business associate and he had received his help to organise the financing, according what it is said, of 50.000 million pesetas in favour of  the Solidarity trade union, through Panama banks” (95).

Locked to him the IOR gates, Calvi directs himself to the Opus Dei. According to Carlo Calvi, his father´s plan was to sell to the Opus the 16 % of the Ambrosian, that was into the IOR hands: “ The Opus Dei, would have hidden all the holes that Marcinkus and Luigi Mennini (his right hand) had induced in the Ambrosian Bank”. (96).

In the morning of June the 8th, Calvi told his daughter to leave Italy: “If matters improve, I will call you. Otherwise I will go abroad and I will continue the operation hidden. If matters go worse, I will begin to reveal all that I know” (97).

Since he left prison, the Bank of Italy pressed Calvi with letters requiring explanations about his actions abroad. The May 31st letter was, says Rosone, “a true bombing”. On June the 7th 82, the moment of the truth reaches Calvi: “In a warm administration council meeting, the banker finds himself in minority for first time” (98).

On June the 9th, Carboni finds Calvi in an extreme agitation state: “Mennini had placed before him a brutal ultimatum about the matter of the 300 million dollars, indicating him that this amount ought to be delivered to the IOR not later than the next Friday, 11th of June. Mennini had added that his son Alessandro, a leader of the Ambrosian Bank, had instructions to denounce Calvi´s situation and debts to the magistracy” (99).

On June the 11th, Calvi leaves a written note in his roman apartment: “I must leave due to unexpected reasons”. From the airport of Fiumicino he does several phone calls, one to Mennini: “You should forgive me. I can´t go this morning to the appointment. I will be with you next Monday. Once again I beg your pardon” (100).

On June the 13th, in Klagenfurt (Austria), Calvi unburdens himself with Carboni. He attacks Marcinkus. He talks again about the south american associates (the Bank of Managua and the Andino) and alludes “to a massive displacement of money in Solidarity favour”. In May 1983, Carboni will say to the Milan magistrates: “The following day, Calvi could talk to me of his important friends in South America and also told me that he had made a considerable delivery of money in favour of the Polish trade union Solidarity. Calvi specified that the operation had been elaborated by Marcinkus, taking advantage of the money of the common societies: 100 million dollars USA. Calvi said that he would be willing to control the operation, but Marcinkus had materially done everything by himself, so that he could have the pope, who had in his heart the polish matter, solidly in his hands”. (101).

On June the 14th, Marcinkus handed in his resignation to the Nasau Ambrosian bank general director: “My resignation, he says, is motivated by the fact that it has become impossible for me to find the time to call on the administration council meetings due to the numerous tasks entailed to my present responsibility” (102).

On Thursday the 17th of June, Il Sole 24 ore publishes the whole text of the Bank of Italy last letter, putting out the calamitous news about the Ambrosian´s external debt. The collapse happened in the Stock Exchange. The last Ambrosian administration Council takes place in the evening. It is decided to place the bank under a commercial management. From now on, the Bank of Italy will take care of the Ambrosian.

That same day, Graziella Corrocher, Calvi´s secretary, falls down from the fourth floor of the Ambrosian central headquarters, leaving a “suicide note” in which she curses Calvi because of the harm caused. Some say that she “had committed  suicide”. Something similar happens some months later, on October the 2nd , with Giuseppe Dellacha, an executive of the same bank. Calvi dies in London several hours after his secretary. His body appears the following day hung under the bridge of the Black Brothers (103).

Calvi hung

At two o’clock p.m. professor Keith Simpson carried out an autopsy, according to which Calvi died “because of suffocation due to hanging”. He still was alive when the slipknot was locked. The objects in his jacket and in his trousers (two pieces of brick and three stones) had been submerged in water; therefore, the Thames tide reached certain level. Death time was established about two o’clock in the early morning. (104). According to professor Simpson, “there was no evidences suggesting that the hanging was another thing that a suspension inflicted by himself” (105).

Calvi´s death hearing concludes on July the 3rd. Jury’s sentence: suicide. Nevertheless, why should Calvi elect a so macabre and complicated way of dying?

It could have been a ritual assassination. In some masonry ancient initiation ceremonies the new member is warned that if he reveals loggia’s secrets he will be hung and his body washed by the ebb and flow of the tide. To make it thoroughly clear,  “around the collar it is placed a tied string with the end hanging from the back” and the candidate solemnly swears that he never will reveal “neither part nor parts, neither point nor points” of the masonry own secrets “under a sentence of no less – in case of infringement of some of them – than my head be cut, my tongue took out by its root and buried in sea sand over the ebb tide line, or at a range of one cable from the beach, where the tide ebbs and flows twice in twenty four hours, or the most effective punishment of being marked as a consciously perjured individual, deprived of any moral dignity and fully inadequate to be received in this venerable loggia” (106). 

The jury verdict raises many doubts. Some italian newspapers even suggest that London and Rome police investigators have received instructions from the highest political levels to dictate a suicide veredict and to close Calvi´s bundle, “due to the uncomfortable connections with weapons traffic for Argentine and of the Vatican Bank implication in this case” (107).

A second hearing was decided, taking place on June the 27th 1983. During the debate Calvi´s family  and Carboni´s attorneys confront violently. Calvi´s family testifies that the banker feared for his life. Clara Calvi enumerates, among his many enemies, politicians, Vatican internal elements and others. He says that his husband was in disposition to deliver in the appeal trial the names of political and Vatican figures. She also reveals that on May 82, one month before his death, her husband had told her that a high IOR functionary was trying to seize the documents where he had recorded his financial operations with the Vatican Bank.

According to Robert Clake, London’s attorney who had helped Calvi to get lodging in London at the request of Hans Kunz (Carboni´s Swiss friend), Kunz told him that Carboni had acted “on behalf of the Vatican interests” and that if arrangements were not have been made for the London trip “the italian government could have fallen down”.

Professor Antonio Fornari, Pavía University legal medicine Institute director, presented in the second hearing, a specialist’s report on behalf of Calvi´s family. Professor Fornari discovered a large stain on Calvi´s trousers external bottom.  A little before dying, Calvi had sat on a very dirty place. In his opinion, on a boat’s bottom. One person, in the night darkness, had placed himself at his back, and maintaining a string in his hand, had made a knot pressing it around his collar: “He was strangulated from his back, says Fornari, and immediately afterwards, they hung him from the handrail”

Palermo court’s sentence (September the 8th 1985) against the mafia´s leadership, gathers Tommaso Busceta´s testimony about an obscure figure, Pippo Calò, to whom he accuses of being implicated “in the most grave kidnappings and, in Rome, in obscure plots, among them in Calvi´s case”. (110). The trial resulted in 19 life imprisonment penalties and some additional of more than two thousand years imprisonment. On March the 23rd 1992 judge Giovanni Falcone was assassinated, with his wife and three bodyguards. And on July the 19th the turn was for judge Paolo Borsellino and five agents. Both judges had written the Palermo sentence.

On 1992, roman magistracy achieves to transfer Calvi´s case to the capital and it continues the investigation that concludes with the arrest warrant against Pippo Calò and Flavio Carboni, issued by judge Mario Almerighi on April the 8th 1997. Both, according to the accusation, had prepared “in mutual and with collaboration of others” (not identified yet) the banker’s assassination “using the organisation called Cosa Nostra, in order to get impunity and to maintain the benefit of the crime of collaboration in fraudulent bankruptcy”: Calò “delivering instructions to other associated delinquents, who acted in fact, strangling Calvi and simulating the suicide”; Carboni “delivering Calvi to the actual executors”

The motive would be the following: “Calvi would have seized, as before had done Sindona, part of the Cosa Nostra treasure, promising to invest it and to make it productive, but, at the end, trapped by the debts, and he wouldn´t had been able to give it back” (111).

According to the roman magistrates, the Milan banker was assassinated by the plot mafia-camorra-masonry”. Calvi had possibly “become a mad unreliable splinter”, “the fear existed that Calvi could try to save himself though blackmail manoeuvres against his former allies” and “the fear that the banker could reveal the information he possessed” (112).

A small detail. Calvi´s corpse appears without moustache. Had he shaved it to go unnoticed? A witness, Cecil Gerard Coomer, says that he had coincided (about 2200 hrs) with Calvi, in front of the hotel lift. He had the moustache, although it were very light. It seemed to him, Hitler’s face. He appeared thoughtful,  pensive, worried. Two younger men accompany him, talking italian between them. Such circumstance supports the hypothesis that before hanging Calvi he was chloroformed and shaved then to avoid leaving any track. (113)

Arrest warrant against Marcinkus

On July the 31st ,1982, one month and a half after Calvi´s death, three registered envelopes arrive to the Vatican. They come from Milan and the addressees are Paul Marcinkus and his two collaborators, Luigi Mennini and Pellegrino De Strobel. An investigation had been initiated upon these individuals´ hypothetical implication in the Ambrosian Bank crack. Milan judges ordered the precautionary sequestration of the property that the three suspects possessed in italian territory (114).

The three envelopes were delivered to the Italian ambassador before the Holy See, Claudio Cheli. They were rejected due to technicalities. Plea transmissions to foreign authorities should be done by diplomatic channels. The struggle over juridical formalities would last more than five years.

IOR members invoked, besides, immunity benefits contained in the article 11th of the Letran pacts. On October the 3rd 1983,  the examining magistrate Antonio Prizzi rejected such pretension: “Judicial notifications upon evidences of consummated crimes, with damage to italian subjects and carried out with italian citizens collaboration, have been sent to the IOR members”.

Milan magistrates continue investigating. On January the 23rd 1987, Pier Luigi María Dell´ Oso request judge Renato Bricchetti to issue an immediate capture order against Marcinkus, Mennini and De Strobel: “IOR support, which has been an irreplaceable associate of the operational system initiated by Calvi, has represented an unequivocal constant in the activity carried out by the Ambrosian bank executive group, culminating with the issue of the sponsorship letters, what have revealed harmful for the said bank” (115).

On February the 20th the Milan magistrates Antonio Prizzi and Renato Bricchetti sign the arrest warrants. It is not questioned this or that operation, but the whole of the relationship of the IOR with the Ambrosian, the agreement, the understanding and the collaboration, without exception, that both banks mutually delivered for several years.

From the Milan Ambrosian Bank it was possible to reach a series of financial societies set up  called “Panamanian” or “ghost societies”: “those societies, says the arrest warrant, had been thought and were controlled by the IOR and Calvi; later on, huge sums of money, that appeared like usual banking operations, were delivered to Calvi to pass them to the mentioned societies”. They really served for “different purposes and they produced an enormous stream of money with no return”.

According to the magistrates, the IOR agreed to “cover up the reality in order to avoid leaving any track upon the possible connections between the Ambrosian and the main Panamanian financier among all the ghost societies”, “the Vatican bank has served as a formidable support for Calvi´s anomalous operations”, and all this “proofs the existence of a deep understanding, taking place continuously, between the IOR and Ambrosian bank managers”

Because of this, the IOR “is responsible of distraction, concealment, squandering  and, in any case, of destruction” of the Ambrosian Bank assets. The crack meant a hole of about 1.200 million dollars (about 156.000 million pesetas)” (116).

On April the 13th 1987, the italian Freedom Court rejected and IOR appeal based on the accused immunity. IOR attorneys appealed to the Supreme Court. On July the 17th, the italian Supreme Court definitively repealed the warrant orders: “An italian court can´t meddle in which three IOR managers have done, because they did not made it as private individuals, but as leaders and managers of the IOR” (117).

The Milan Penalty Court examining magistrates played the last resort, that of the Constitutional Court, with a request lodged on November the 26th. On June the 6th 1988, the Constitutional Court signed a sentence liberating definitively Marcinkus. None of the italian republic courts could prosecute neither to the IOR´s president nor his two collaborators. The central character of the IOR among the Catholic Church organisms was established and the consequent immunity guaranteed by the Treaty of Letran was confirmed. (118).

The parliamentary commission of investigation over the P2, says: “In fact, the IOR presence served as a cover to the banks, fiduciary and intermediary societies, of shadow-companies, of ciphered banking accounts disseminated all over the world, from Panama to Hong Kong; a mix-up, leaded by the Ambrosian Bank and the P2 band that had assumed the property and full control, born not only for fiscal evasion reasons and to flee the monetary authority control, but also to hide the flow and the laundering of the foul money” (119).

The relationship between the IOR and the Ambrosian had already been initiated in 1972; it is to say, one year after the nomination of Marcinkus as president of the vatican bank. After the buying and selling of the Catholic Bank of Veneto, the IOR and the Ambrosian created a relationship that exceeded by far the normal ties between credit institutions.

IOR´s complicity.

          On December the 27th 1982 it was officially announced the signature of an agreement to create an italo-vatican joint commission (three members from each part) to study the IOR-Ambrosian matter.

          The italian side commissioners distinguish among an “official literature” and a “parallel literature”. The most important document in the parallel documentation is the famous letter of disclaimer, but the italian commissioners know another nineteen documents of the same type, written by Calvi in a very prolonged period of time and above all from 1976 to 1981 (120). This demonstrates that the sponsorship letters and of the letter of disclaimer purpose, on the part of Marcinkus and of Calvi, represent “the evolution – in a difficult moment – of the tactics already experimented in the pass”

Attorney Pasquale Chiomenti, president of the italian part of the commission, concludes that if it really does not show up the sure proof that the IOR be the true owner of the sponsored societies, it whereas appears “farther away of any possibility of doubt, the proof that, at least for some time from 1974,  there was a very tight relationship among Roberto Calvi and the IOR, in the Ambrosian Bank all of them in order to cover Roberto Calvi´s not very orthodox positions and activities of the field of the Ambrosian Bank and the societies or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by it”.

Chiomenti recalls that Marcinkus presented a lot of documents before the commission in order to deny that he were the owner of the sponsored societies, but at the same time these papers certainly demonstrate “that the IOR knew that its behaviour delivered to Roberto Calvi the means to start operations that he wouldn’t be able to carry out under the sun’s light”.

According to the three vatican commissioners, “up to June 1981, the IOR only knew the MANIC and the United Trading Company (UTC), but it ignored the existence of the eight subsidiaries and, in consequence, it was in the dark about its activity”. (121)

The commission worked for less than three months and arrived to limited conclusions. The results was a transaction. The agreement was signed in Geneva on May 25th 1984, in the office of the Free Interchange European Association. There was sixty functionaries representing the 109 creditor banks. The ceremony had no precedents. The IOR ought to pay 250 million dollars, in three instalments. Early payment would obtain discount. The IOR exactly paid 240.822.222 dollars and 23 cents (122)

When the British newspaperman Cornwell ask Marcinkus why the Vatican paid such amount of money if it has nothing to do in that business, he answers: “You have mistaken the man” (123).

This man is Agostino Casaroli. State Secretary from July 1979 and from 1980 on a member of the Vigilance commission of the IOR, he had arrived with new plans. On March 81 he refused to approve the IOR´s annual balance, if he was not allowed to study the documents enough in advance. And at the end of the Spring, a commission of fifteen Cardinals was created for all these questions. About Calvi business, according to Flavio Carboni, the pope said: “Let everything to fall down. Let Cardinal Casaroli to take care of it” (124).

Against Casaroli is especially addressed the letter that Calvi writes to John Paul II, on June the 5th 1982, some days before his death:

“Your Holiness, I have thought a lot, a lot in these days. I have thought a lot, Your Holiness,  and I have concluded that You are the ultimate hope, the ultimate… Your Holiness, I myself have assumed the heavy load of the mistakes and the faults committed by the present and the past IOR representatives, including the Sindona´s misdeeds from which I still suffer its consequences. I myself have been, under the precise order of Your authorised representatives, the one who carried out peculiar financing in favour of many countries and associations from the East and the West; I myself have been the one who, in accordance with the vatican authorities, have co-ordinated in all Central and South America, the creation of numerous banking entities, above all in order to resist the penetration of pro marxist ideologies and, finally, I myself am betrayed and abandoned precisely by this authority to whom I have always rendered most respect and obedience… We know who are the external adversaries, and You, Your Holiness, know it better than anybody and you fight them better than anybody; but the internal ones, in the Church I mean, the related, like some demo christians, you, Your Holiness, do you know them? I don’t think so. I am not a gossip and I am not one that accuses out of spite or revenge either. Therefore I am not interested in considering the many rumours that fall on some prelates and, in particular, on the private life of the State Secretary Casaroli, but I am very interested in pointing out the good relationship existing among him and notoriously anticlerical environments and personages, like the demo christian politician Nino Andreatta, with whom it looks like he has reached an agreement for the destruction and distribution of the Ambrosian Group.. But,  to which plan wants or must obey the State Secretary? To which blackmail?. (125).

The letter written to the pope will not be sent that day and perhaps never. Calvi placed it in the small case he took with him to London in his last escape.

On 1982 Marcinkus is excluded from the trips of the papal entourage

On February the 11th 1984, Bettino Craxi, italian Council president at the moment, and cardinal Casaroli, Vatican State Secretary, sign the concordat between the Church and the State. It was said then that Craxi had signed only under the condition that Casaroli would close the contentious confronting the IOR with its creditors.

According with the attorney Pasquale Chiomenti, “ the pope was against the idea to pay even one cent, convinced as he was that the matter was a dispute between laymen and that there was no legal proofs of Marcinkus responsibility” (126). Casaroli turned to the pope and drew a yes from him.

Casaroli understood perfectly, after having spent hours and hours upon thousands of documents, which was Marcinkus´ weak spot. Who was the owner of the Manic, UTC and Zitropo, the three holdings leading numerous ghost societies responsible of the Ambrosian hole of more than 1.200 million dollars?. There was no doubt: the IOR, since the stocks were issued to the name of the bearer and they were in his stock portfolio. But, one of the Geneva act clauses, on May the 25th 1984, foresaw the devolution on the part of Marcinkus of all the titles of those three holdings that the IOR carried on hand. What did all this mean? Very simple: that the IOR was the authentic owner of Manic, UTC and Zitropo; and that its managers couldn’t ignore what was happening before their eyes (127).

When the newspaperwoman Laura Colby published this news (128) on 1987, Marcinkus felt himself out of action. He did not answer immediately, but two years later with a memorial prepared by his attorneys and reproduced in the book of Cornwell, A thief in the night.

To demolish Marcinkus´ thesis it would have been enough to revise the documentation of the Bank of Gotardo, of Lugano, that Marcinkus expected to stay buried in a swiss bank. Nevertheless, “the boxes with the precious swiss documents were sent to Milan on 1990 spring, exactly before the initiation of the trial for the Ambrosian bank crack”

On March the 9th 1989 Marcinkus dismissal as IOR president is announced. It is carried out in a discreet way, in the context of a reform in the IOR structure. A five members cardinals commission, named by the pope for a five years period, looks after the IOR fidelity to its statutes. A prelate, not a bishop, named by the cited commission, follows the institute’s life, but with neither executive nor management function; an administration council looks after the financial activity; among its functions appears that of naming the director and the deputy director of the IOR – always laymen – and of three auditors

Sindona poisoned 

On March 27th 1980, Sindona was declared guilty of 68 fraud charges, undue appropriation of bank funds and perjury. Waiting for the sentence, he was imprisoned in the Manhattan Metropolitan Correctional Centre. On May the 13th 1980, two days before the sentence, Sindona tried to commit suicide.

On July the 7th 1981, the italian government accused Sindona of being responsible of the assassination of Giorgio Ambrosoli, Milan attorney in charge of the  investigation of the crack of his banks.

On January the 25th 1982, Sindona was sentenced in Palermo, together with 75 members of the mafia families Gambino, Inzerillo and Spatola. They were accused of having carried out heroin traffic between Sicily and the United States valued yearly in 600 million dollars (129).

Sindona was extradited to Italy in 1984 and in 1986 he was sentenced to life imprisonment found guilty of having ordered Ambrosoli assassination. He died on August the 22nd, in the prison of Voghera, by drinking poisoned coffee. The investigation officially talks of suicide, but it is not able of explaining how the poison reaches Sindona. Two days before he had been condemned to life imprisonment Sindona had menaced to reveal, after years of strict silence, the mysteries of the hidden organisation to which he belonged (130)

Two years in advance, the 27th of September 1984, Francesco Pazienza delivered to his attorney a strange document titled How Sindona will be eliminated. Written before Sindona´s extradition, the document supposed that if Sindona was imprisoned in a normal jail he would be assassinated by his own mates, whereas if he was imprisoned in a maximum security jail and in isolation (as he was), the italian secret services will take up to him a poisoned cup of coffee. 

In the case that Sindona died in a “clean” situation and unexpectedly, it would mean that the Americans had joined the play. Pazienza stated that only the Americans could deliver to the Italians sophisticated poisons able to kill without leaving tracks that could be detected in the autopsy: “The Italians only are able of using arsenic and cyanide”. Therefore, Sindona´s death responsible probably were the italian secret services and not the Americans: The used poison was the cyanide. Nevertheless, the investigators find more logic the conclusion of a suicide, since, they say, Sindona drank the cup of coffee up to the bottom, in spite of the taste, the smell and the heartburn

According to Pazienza, also the Vatican wanted to see Sindona dead, “the other who knew”, besides Calvi. Altogether with the secret services and the Vatican, “the third interested in Sindona´s death was Giulio Andreotti” (131):

Ambrosian Bank trial  

The trial on the Ambrosian Bank crack, was initiated on the 29th of May 1990, after eight years of investigations, that began after the initiation of the bank’s liquidation, ordered 50 days after Calvi´s death.

“The judicial decision, considered spectacular in Italy, since it affects to first line personages of the companies, the industry and the finances, was delivered after two years of debates, 119 audiences and one week of deliberation by the court. The financial hole brought about by the Ambrosian Bank crack was about 150.000 million pesetas and it meant the ruin of many savers and large ups and downs in the economical world” (132)

Ambrosian Bank’s top management and that of the loggia P2 were condemned by the Third Section of the Penal in the Milan Audience. The larger sentences fell upon the P2´s leaders: 18 years and a half prison for Licio Gelli and 19 for Umberto Ortolani.

Sentences pronounced are 34 in total, adding up to 300 years of prison for 33 charged. Other accused are: the ex-manager of the editorial group Rizzoli, Bruno Tassan Din (14 years); the Ambrosian managers, Roberto Rosone (12 years) and Orazio Bagnasco (7 years and a half); the ex-secret agent Francesco Pazienza (14 years and 8 months); Flavio Carboni (15 years).

Some of the persons charged logged appeals, that the Appeals and the Supreme courts should solve (133)

Other matter related to the Ambrosian Bank is that of the illegal commission of the bill called Protection, a commission that ends in the italian socialist party chest. On the 29th of July 1994, Milan court pronounced sentence against Bettino Craxi, ex secretary of the PSI and the ex italian prime minister, and against Claudio Martelli, ex italian justice minister, a socialist too. Both were condemned to eight years an a half in prison. Craxi run away to Tunez, where he stays up to his death.

Together with them Licio Galli with six years and a half in prison, the ENI ex vice-president and socialist Leonardo Di Donna with seven years, and the architect Silvano Larini, for the lending of his current account, with five years and a half, were condemned

Dangerous connection 

It is certainly surprising the series of assassinations and violent attempts, related, in one or other way, with the P2, the mafia, the Ambrosian, the Vatican Bank: the public prosecutor Giorgio Ambrosoli, who investigated Sindona´s banks crack, is assassinated on the 11th of July 1979; judge Emilio Alessandrini, who investigated Calvi´s and Ambrosian´s activities, is assassinated on the 29th of January 1979; John Paul I, who wanted to end the vatican business, dies in strange circumstances on the 29th of September 1978; in May 1981, when he had abandoned the Ambrosian to his luck and Calvi is imprisoned, John Paul II suffers a brutal attempt; Calvi dies hung in 1982; Calvi´s secretary and one Ambrosian executive also die that same year; Sindona dies poisoned in 1986. Concluding, the connection IOR-Ambrosian becomes very dangerous,

In September 1989, from the 10th to the 17th , I was in Tenerife guiding a catechumenal inspiration course in La Vera parish. Precisely those days cardinal Antonio Javierre, vatican archives responsible, was preaching the quinario of the Christ of the Laguna. He was besides delivering some conferences in a Convent in Garachico, former island capital. I assisted to the Saturday conference with a group. The theme was the mission of the laymen in today’s Church. After the conference, that took place in the chapel, there was no dialogue, but a solemn mass. The first reading talked about the golden calf, that false god before which Israel people prostrates. (134). In the homily the cardinal talked about the Virgin and, apparently, without any inspiration on the Magnificat  Of course, we didn´t expect that he would reveal any vatican secret.

The following day, back in Madrid, I read in the newspaper an article that attracted my attention. It was written by a priest who is, precisely, a cardinal´s brother. I don’t know why he brought about the lament of the poet Pablo Neruda: “I looked for the wise priests,/ I waited for them after the rite,/ I watched them when they came out,/ to visit God and the demon./ They were bored by my questions./ They didn´t knew too much either;/ they only were functionaries” (135). I coudn´t less that to recall what had happened the previous day. I thought of the wise priests who write books about pope Luciani and that do not want to know anything about the modern golden calf.